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 This article analyzed the change at the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) after the appointment of William Bratton as police commissioner of 
the NYPD. It specifically argues the steps William Bratton took to effect a 
change and demonstrate elements of an effective change management 
process including the leader’s role in driving that change. This article 
demonstrated how five phases of change implemented in the NYPD. These 
phases are 1) defining goals and future state 2) creating an environment for 
change 3) planning the change 4) executing and improving and 5) 
integrating and sustaining change. In the discussion part, this article 
discussed how this model and the tactics can be adapted to manage the 
change of other police organizations, mainly İstanbul Police Department 
which is comparable to the NYPD in many respects. The implication of this 
paper is that it is possible to change the police and police organizations to 
serve in a way that responds the needs of changing society. The prior thing 
is a strong desire and increased understanding of change process.  
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Introduction 
 Change is inevitable. As we enter the 21st century, we have all 
witnessed a time period that the world, human life, and everything change 
even faster than before. Changing society, the impact of globalization and 
rapidly evolving technologies impose changes within the organization itself. 
Police organizations are not out of this process that calls for adaptive, 
creative, and immediate change that will respond the needs of the society. 
However, it is common to refer in literature that police organizations possess 
a culture with certain values and beliefs unique to the police occupation that 
challenge and resist to the change within the organization (Wood, 2004; 
Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Maanen, 1975; Manning 1977; Siegel, 1999). 
Therefore, the story of change at the NYPD has received considerable 
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attention from the scholars of management, leadership, organizational 
behavior and communication. They strongly needed to understand how a 
police organization, with such a big population and long tradition, has changed 
in such a short time, and elements of an effective change management 
process. To understand the NYPD case is particularly important for other 
police organizations wherein change is needed. In spite of the differences in 
the culture, political atmosphere, society, resources and population of police 
organizations, there are certainly some points that are comparable and 
adaptable to other police organizations.  
 Within this context, the main purpose of this study is to narrate the 
change at the NYPD after the appointment of William Bratton as police 
commissioner of the NYPD. It specifically argues the steps he took to effect 
a change and demonstrate elements of an effective change management 
process including the leader’s role in driving that change. A change 
management model that has been developed by evaluating the lessons 
learned from repeated change management initiatives is used to show in 
what ways the tactics, programs and projects used by Bratton fit into this 
model (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007). Finally, it aims to discuss how this 
model and the tactics can be adapted to manage the change of other police 
organizations, mainly police organizations in Turkey.   
 
Literature Review 
The Need for a Change at the NYPD 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the situation in the New York City has 
certainly called for a change in police organization. Although there were 
some initiatives to change the philosophy of policing and organization itself 
in this period of time, none of them reached the results aimed at the 
beginning by 1994. After Rudolph Giuliani become the Mayor of New York, 
he decided that the NYPD was one agency that certainly need a leader who is 
able to initiate a change process to reach the aims he announced to the public 
before the election. Although New York City is known with its Democrat 
tendency, a Republican, Rudolph Giuliani, had been elected in 1993 largely 
for the campaigns principally on the issues of quality-of-life and crime. In 
this environment, reducing crime and selecting a police commissioner 
compatible with this goal was critical for the success of Giuliani. To reach 
these goals, Giuliani turned to William Bratton who was best known for his 
role in turning around the crime rate in subway system of New York City 
(Buntin, 1999; Steinhauer, 2006; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Therefore, 
Giuliani selected William Bratton to be police commissioner of New York 
City on December 2, 1993, the number one police job in America (Buntin, 
1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). 
 When William Bratton took command of the NYPD, the situation in 
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New York City was a mess. People were afraid of being a victim of a crime. 
New Yorkers certainly had a strong desire to be a way out of the danger and 
lawlessness they experience every day that made living in New York so 
uncomfortable (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). 
Surveys indicated that “more than half the people who had recently left the 
city did so to improve the quality of their lives and chief among the reasons 
they couldn’t do that in the city was crime” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 1). 
In addition to serious crimes, quality of life crimes and disorder had 
occupied the streets of the New York City. New Yorkers used to see men 
and women using the streets and sidewalks as outdoor toilets and using 
aggressive begging. When they stop their car at a traffic light, it was usual to 
see a guy, called squeegee men, in front of the car cleaning the windows with 
a filthy rag and demanding money for his efforts (Frum, 2006; Bratton & 
Knobler, 1998). In response to this situation, in 1990, Mayor David Dinkins 
was able to pass ‘Safe Streets’ legislation that increased the size of the police 
officers over six thousand (Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005; Vitale, 2005; 
Bratton & Knobler, 1998). However, even this increase hadn’t seemed to 
help much by 1994. The police department seemed demoralized, 
dysfunctional and corrupted (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). The main 
philosophy was “stay low and avoid trouble” (Maanen, 1975, p. 222).  
 The way of policing was reactive. Officers would pace from one 
crime scene to another in response to radio calls, doing very little in the way 
of proactive policing for reducing and preventing crime (Mencimer, 2001). 
Many scholars asserted that crime was caused by social problems that were 
impervious to police intervention. However, Bratton had his own reasons to 
believe that police could have a significant effect on crime and crime could 
be reduced by using law enforcement expertise, leadership and management 
skills, and an inspired workforce (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Smith & 
Bratton, 2001).  
 When he was forced to resign his New York post in 1996 for stealing 
too many headlines, 27 months after the appointment, he had already 
received the national attention over crime reduction. Time magazine put 
Bratton on its cover in January 1996 to honor New York’s dramatic drop in 
crime (Steinhauer, 2006; Kasindorf, 2002). NYPD, within leadership of 
Bratton, was able to reduce crimes at a remarkable rate. “In 1993, New 
Yorkers reported 600,346 index crimes (murder and non-negligent 
homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson, the crimes reported in the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports). In 1994, that number fell to 530,120, a 12 percent 
decline. In comparison, index crimes in the country as a whole had fallen 
just 1.1 percent. The decline in crime from 1993 to 1994 meant that 385 
fewer people died. 13,461 fewer people were robbed and 3,023 fewer 
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people were assaulted” (Buntin, 1999, p. 27). The decline in crime carried 
on in 1994 as well.     
 Moreover, after the resignation, a survey conducted by a nonprofit 
public policy group found that 71 percent of all respondents approved of 
Bratton’s performance. He had been given credit for changing crime rate. In 
a similar vein, the approval rating of the Police Department had a 73 percent 
positive rating, up from just 37 percent in a 1992 poll (Kocieniewski, 1996). 
The results clearly show that the NYPD was not only successful in reducing 
crime but also increasing in public support within this process. In this regard, 
the question is what were the tactics, techniques, strategies and models used 
to turn around the NYPD to a success story. 
 
Change Management Process: Case of the NYPD  
 When William Bratton initiated a change process at the NYPD, most 
probably, he did not have an idea of following a model to manage the 
change. He had spent his whole professional life in police organizations. He 
had the leadership skills and experience to turn around low-performing, 
demoralized, dysfunctional police departments in his career. However, it is 
doubtful to suggest that he was able to understand abstract notion and model 
behind the tactics he used to change the NYPD. Although he puts emphasize 
on change many times in his book, articles and speeches, he has never 
mentioned a change management model he used in the process of change at 
the NYPD and other organizations he used to work. When you look at the 
tactics he used to effect and manage change in the course of his career, you 
realize the elements compatible to change management model. The change 
management model used in this study has strong consistency with the 
process followed by Bratton.  
 This change management model suggests five phases each with a 
supplemental categories for effectively managing the implementation of 
change within an organization 1) Define Business Goal and Future State; 2) 
Create an Environment for Change; 3) Plan the Change; 4) Execute and 
Improve; 5) Integrate and Sustain (see appendix-1) (PowerPoint, March 23, 
2007). The following section will demonstrate in what ways this model is 
compatible to change at the NYPD. 
 Define Business Goals and Future State: Before Bratton took the 
command of the NYPD; he had already proved that police could reduce 
crime. He had reduced crime significantly when he was leading to Boston 
Police Department and Metropolitan Transit Authority. When he was 
invited to an interview with Giuliani’s team, he told that his plan would 
reduce crime in New York by 40 percent in three years, with a 10 percent 
reduction in crime in the first year alone (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 
1999). Although his plan and goals was consistent with Giuliani who was 
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willing to back up and provide him political authorization for the plan, the 
goals he declared for a city like New York seemed unrealistic to majority. 
After the appointment, he also declared his audacious goals to public by 
taking the risk of looking bad if he does not achieve them, but at the same 
time, he believed that articulating such audacious and bold goals was an 
important aspect of motivating the organization to perform and 
demonstrating public that he is confident and ambitious (Bratton & Knobler, 
1998; Buntin, 1999; Smith & Bratton, 2001). In this way, he was able to 
inspire multiple audiences a vision to reduce crime. In fact, this goal was in a 
way consistent with the idea that police could have a significant effect on 
crime. In this respect, from the beginning of his duty, he intended to create 
an organization whose goal and mission was to control and prevent crime for 
a ‘safe and clean city’ not just respond to it (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; 
Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). He had a compelling vision appeals to head 
and heart of the officers as follow, “We will fight for every house in this city. 
We will fight for every street. We will fight for every borough. And we will 
win” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p.3). 
 However, police organizations which are believed to have strong 
cultural resistors to change (Wood, 2004; Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Van 
Maanen, 1975, Manning 1977; Siegel, 1999) cannot be transformed simply 
by setting and communicating optimistic and audacious goals. Leaders 
should understand values, cultural dynamics of the organization (Schein, 
1995). Within the light of this idea, Bratton asked consultants to carry out a 
kind of cultural diagnostic survey of the NYPD to see to what extent the 
organization’s cultural values and priorities match his values and 
priorities (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). The first thing that 
survey suggested was the difference in the priorities of managers and front-
line officers on the ground. Managers valued “holding down overtime; 
staying out of trouble; clearing backlog of radio runs; reporting police 
corruption; and treating bosses with deference” rather than “reducing 
crime, disorder, and fear” which was Bratton’s major goal (Buntin, 1999, p. 
6). In contrast, officers on the ground valued “reducing crime, disorder, and 
fear; making gun arrests; providing police services to people who 
requested them; gaining public confidence in police integrity; arresting 
drug dealers; correcting quality-of-life conditions; and staying out of 
trouble”(Buntin, 1999, p. 6). They seemed to share Bratton and Giuliani’s 
priorities. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to believe that if Bratton 
communicated his own goals, they would respond enthusiastically. 
 Bratton took advantage of this situation and communicated his 
desire repeatedly to reduce crime, disorder, and fear by taking back the 
streets through different channels. Throughout the process, Bratton and his 
team translated these goals and priorities into clear, achievable, 
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measurable outcomes and promoted an outcome-oriented culture. This 
helped them to demonstrate progress in the change effort. They also 
prepared strategies such as ‘getting guns out of streets’ and ‘reclaiming the 
public spaces of New York’ considering the priorities and their goals 
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). 
 Create and Environment for Change: Within the process of 
creating an environment for change, Bratton become a visible and involved 
leader that reinforces behaviors in subordinates that are consistent with 
change objectives. In fact, he mostly used the experience he got when he was 
the head of New York Public Transformation Agency. Within the description 
of Bratton, transit police responsible for the safety of subways “had nothing, 
they were nothing, they went nowhere” (Lardner, 1998). He needed to do 
something to increase their motivation and self-respect of officers which is 
mandatory for change. For this purpose, he initiated a process to change the 
old .38 specials with 9- millimeters by arguing that 9- millimeters would be 
safer and more effective than the old .38 specials (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; 
Lardner, 1998). After he announced victory in his 9-millimeter campaign, he 
says, “They would have gone through brick walls for me” (Lardner, 1998). 
He was certainly aware of the clear, a symbolic show of respect of this 
initiative for the transit police who were used to be called as ‘off-police’ by 
the colleagues in other departments (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Lardner, 
1998). 
 He and his team adapted similar processes for police officers 
psychology when he was police commissioner in New York. In his first 
weeks on the job, Bratton requested and received a handgun upgrade for 
the NYPD and improved bullet-proof vests. In a similar vein, he received 
new uniforms for the police force. “Those are all things that motivate 
people, particularly when you don’t have some of the traditional 
motivators that we tend to think of, meaning salary and benefits” (Bratton 
& Knobler, 1998, p. 85). They also made it clear that they back up the 
police as long as they act properly. They demonstrated their support and 
trust to police officers many times if there is not clear evidence of police 
wrongdoing. At the same time, policing style he supported was 
compatible with officers’ desire, letting them take more decisions on the 
ground, and moving them away from desk jobs (Economist, 1998). The 
result of these and other efforts was a clear increase in police officers’ 
morale which certainly create an environment for change.  
 He used the power of media not only to become visible as a leader 
representing the NYPD but also to communicate his messages to the 
members of the NYPD. He used the press not only to share the success of his 
new methods but also to call attention to police officers, who had done well, 
and to call them to a higher standard.  In this way, a clear sense of goal has 
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been communicated throughout the organization. A story in the newspapers 
could have more impact on police behavior than any number of other tools. 
Bratton and Giuliani also backed up the police officers involved in 
confrontations with the public without clear evidence of police 
wrongdoing. The stories on the media on these issues clearly increased in 
police officers’ morale and sent message that they trusted the police and 
would support officers as long as they acted properly which was essential to 
motivate front-line officers to reclaim the streets (Buntin, 1999; Lardner, 
1998, Newfield & Jacobson, 2000; Vitale, 2005). In a similar vein, he used 
media to communicate his messages to the public to build confidence and 
provide a broad sense of legitimacy to the police. He was comfortable 
dealing with the media and using it as a kind of both internal and external 
public relations tool. 
 Bratton also took action to change the way of policing. Officers’ 
main philosophy was to respond to crime, doing very little in the way of 
proactive policing for reducing and preventing crime. Bratton was a strong 
believer in the ‘Broken Windows’ theory of policing (Keeling & Wilson, 
1982). He believed that changing the rules of the policing on the ground 
compatible with ‘Broken Windows’ theory of policing can change policing 
philosophy and practices needed to reduce crime. In other words, this style 
was developing culture of prevention and reduction crime rather than 
reaction. Fortunately, New Yorkers’ desire for change provided a kind of 
support for this kind policing which is open to criticism for being 
aggressive.  
 Although Bratton was eager to encourage aggressive policing, he 
did not adapt the traditional model of a highly centralized, reactive 
bureaucracy. He believed that empowering employees throughout the 
organization is important in organizational change. In this regard, Bratton 
devolved a considerable amount of authority to New York’s 76 precinct 
commanders. He was authorizing the precinct commander to be the police 
chief for his or her area and giving them the freedom to deploy their 
resources as they see fit. In this way, he was promoting leadership at all 
levels. Precinct commanders who get excited being a part of the plan were 
competing with each other to present Bratton with their most innovative 
ideas (Moody, 1995; Cordner, 1978; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & 
Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999; Lardner, 1998; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 
2005, Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). At the same time, they were held 
accountable for how they use that power and the results that they obtain.  
 An environment for change process at the NYPD could not be 
created by solely internal factors. In addition to internal factors, there are 
other important external factors at work as well. Major Giuliani was certainly 
supporting this initiative. Bratton developed close relationship with his many 
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constituencies, attending meetings, giving speeches on the church and 
neighborhood organizations in crime ridden areas. In this regard, he was also 
able to get support of external sources such as police union, public, media, 
and local and federal government. One example is that the New York City 
Police Foundation provided significant funding for the NYPD’s initial 
development of Compstat (Moody, 1995; Vitale, 2005).  He also provided 
funding for different kinds of police equipment by using several other 
external sources. 
 Even though being a role model for the members of the NYPD is 
essential in change process, in fact, he was not a fully successful role model 
for some reasons. He made his own people accountable but not himself to 
mayor. In addition, his life style was completely different from the ordinary 
police chiefs. He interested in having trips, being a part of New York High 
Society and spending money (Lardner, 1998). 
 Plan the Change: Methodical plan is essential for the change 
management because the following phases are based on the plan.  However, 
the NYPD has not the plans and analysis even for tomorrow. Bratton 
certainly needed to determine gaps in current systems that must be 
addressed to plan and implement change. Within this mind, Bratton spent 
considerable amount of time taking briefings and discussing the situation 
with team members in order to determine gaps in current systems that must 
be addressed to implement change. He decided to set up a planning office 
involving key personnel and stakeholders for plan development and 
monitoring results, progress and projects. Planning should be made to 
prioritize and respond the gaps in current system. In this regard, he and his 
team studied all the issues and the first three that came out in rapid 
succession were guns, drugs, and youth crime. Those three were increasing 
violent crime in New York City (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). He focused 
his attention this issues at the beginning. In a similar vein, another problem 
was lack of communication among precinct commanders and departments. 
Precinct commanders had not communicated with the officers for months 
and had not known the crime rates within their precincts. In response to 
lack of communication and other gaps in the system, beginning in January 
1994, Bratton instituted major changes in police management: Compstat. 
Compstat was developed as a means to increase the flow of information 
among precinct commanders and departments, with particular emphasis on 
crime and quality of life enforcement information. It has been acclaimed as a 
new police management paradigm that is revolutionizing law enforcement 
management practice (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Vito, Walsh & 
Kunselman, 2005; Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & 
Smith, 2001). 
 Compstat was the essential governance model used in this process not 
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only to plan the change but also to execute and improve the change. This 
system connected all the various districts to headquarters and allowed 
precinct commanders to see maps showing the latest crime trends on their 
precincts, helping them shut down hot spots before they got out of hand and 
monitoring and reviewing police performance at the district level through 
regular meetings (Mencimer, 2001; Harcourt, 2002). Compstat’s statistical 
maps were analyzed each week at a meeting of the city’s police chief and 
precinct commanders. With the support of the system, the NYPD used the 
data collected routinely for assessment. They were able to know update data 
on crime trends and hot spots which was the base of the planning the change 
process, implementing the plan and monitoring the results of the plan 
(Pooley, 1996; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). Moreover, the data 
and regular Compstat meetings provided a ground for communication 
horizontally across organizational lines, exchanging of best practices and 
innovative strategies. This situation allowed different units to make 
modifications in their strategies according to practices and tactics which are 
proven to work.  
 Bratton and his team have also planned how to use the Compstat to 
hold 76 precinct commanders accountable for how they performed mainly 
to control crime (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Buntin, 1999, Bratton & 
Knobler, 1998; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005; Vitale, 2005). The 
Compstat meetings included information about precinct commander’s 
performance on different issues: “personnel assigned, personnel absence 
rates, incidences of domestic violence and unfounded radio runs, radio car 
accidents, overtime expenditures, and summons activity” (Buntin, 
1999, p. 19). Any precinct commanders knew that they were expected not 
only to have knowledge of the criminal activity within their areas, but to 
have also developed tactics to address those issues. Therefore, regular 
Compstat meetings established a measure of performance and accountability 
for achievement of the goals. Moreover, this system created outcome 
oriented culture by monitoring outcomes and achievements.  
 One of the gaps in the system was policing style. There was a need 
for transforming the way police think about their jobs and communities. Like 
most of American police departments, the NYPD focused on reacting to 
crime by rapid response and arrest rather than reducing and preventing 
crime. Even, police organizations were accepting no responsibility for 
reducing crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001, Buntin, 
1999; Mencimer, 2001). Although there were some initiatives to reduce the 
crime in former periods by using community policing philosophy, he 
believed that the interpretation of the community policing by former chiefs 
was totally inappropriate for a city as big and complicated as New York. He 
disagreed with the interpretation of community policing in a way to make 
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ordinary citizens the partners in combating crime. “Bratton wanted police-
work to be done by the police: On the whole, Bratton believed reducing 
crime was the job of the police, not the citizenry” (Buntin, 1999, p. 10). 
Bratton believed that police could have a significant effect on crime and 
crime could be reduced by using law enforcement expertise (Bratton & 
Knobler, 1998; Mencimer, 2001). Within this mind, the model he supported 
and used was the “Broken Windows” theory of law enforcement, the idea 
that tolerating such minor crimes as graffiti spraying, aggressive 
panhandling, prostitution, public urination, and turnstile jumping encourages 
serious violent crime by sending a signal that the community is not in control 
(Wilson and Keeling, 1982; Vitale, 2005; Frum, 2006; Mencimer 2001, 
Harcourt, 2002).  
 Execute and Improve: The most critical phase of change model is 
execution and improvement. There are so many inspirational plans that stay 
unimplemented. In this regard, the most critical achievement of Bratton and 
his team was to be able to put into practice most of the strategies they had 
planned in that time.  
 Compstat meetings were influential in entrenching the fundamental 
change in practices that the Bratton wants to bring about. “Sustaining any 
process requires constant monitoring. When observation and scrutiny are 
non-existent, the natural tendency is toward inactivity” (Vito, Walsh & 
Kunselman, 2005, p. 192). Therefore, the weekly meetings were fostering 
a sustainable process. Precinct commanders who were the leaders of their 
precincts knew that they are going to be held accountable for the results that 
they obtain and what strategies are they adapting to fix the problems. All 
precinct commanders had to be prepared and present coherent strategies to 
reduce crime. Half of all precinct commanders who showed up unprepared 
had been replaced by Bratton within this process. This model contributed to 
ensure that the strategies were being carried out. It was also a way to assess 
which strategies worked which didn’t (Pooley, 1996; Buntin, 1999).  These 
meeting turned to an effective tool to communicate and share successes and 
failures, and motivate each other. “Innovative tactics that seemed to work 
quickly came to light and were immediately communicated to everyone 
attending; just as failed tactics were quickly exposed” (Buntin, 1999, p. 
16). At the same time, other departments started their own Compstat-like 
meetings (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999). 
As already mentioned, the results of these methods were significant drop in 
crime rates.  
 The NYPD was also focusing on the quality-of-life offenses in 
terms of ‘broken windows policing’ that Bratton had claimed to have an 
effect on crime reduction.  In the first quarter of 1994, arrests of 
unlicensed peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38 
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percent compared to the same period one year earlier (Murdock, 1996; 
Buntin, 1999). The NYPD also fought other types of quality-of-life offenses. 
This type of aggressive policing has also taken criticism, but the falling 
number of crimes certainly became a barrier to stop these critics.  
 Bratton was not alone in the planning and execution of the 
strategies, tactics, and projects. After he took command of the NYPD, he 
moved quickly to develop his own leadership team within the NYPD. This 
leadership team was certainly driven, dedicated, willing to take risks, 
unwilling to fail. Bratton was also open to take experts opinion in his 
professional life. One of those academics, George Kelling, founder of 
‘broken windows policing’ and an influential criminologist, has remained a 
close adviser to Bratton ever since they met (Smith & Bratton, 2001, Buntin, 
1999). He also benefited from some other consultants to make survey of the 
organization and to solve other organizational problems.  
 Integra and Sustain: The strength of the Compstat is that it is a 
management process that can be adapt to constantly changing conditions. It 
was certainly helpful to recognize the progress and identify deficiencies. 
Compstat sessions have become major vehicles for organizational learning. 
Precinct commanders benefited from the success and failures they learnt at 
the Compstat meetings. The development of this process has been attributed 
to the innovative strategies and the dynamic management processes. At the 
same time, other parts of the department started their own Compstat-like 
meetings. With the suggestion of Bratton, a special Compstat process for 
internal affairs was used to analyze corruption and increasing complaints 
for police misconduct (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001). 
With the contribution of Compstat and other strategies, accurate and 
timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless 
follow-up and assessment became the philosophy of the NYPD (Bratton & 
Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999; Vito, Walsh & 
Kunselman, 2005).  
 One of the biggest contribution of Bratton and his team was to build 
internal competency and depersonalized and standardized process. In other 
words, Bratton has achieved to institutionalize change and improvement. 
Most of the strategies and Compstat have been carried on by his successors.  
 
Discussion 
 The NYPD case, specifically Compstat and broken windows 
policing, became an attraction for other public and business organization not 
only in the US but also in the other countries. Compstat has been replicated 
by many other police organizations as well as other business organizations. 
In 1996, Compstat was awarded the prestigious Innovations in American 
Government Award from the Ford Foundation and the John F. Kennedy 
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School of Government (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, Vito, Walsh & 
Kunselman, 2005). In 1998, representatives of over 150 police departments 
from foreign countries visited the NYPD for briefings in broken windows 
policing. For the first ten months of 2000, another 235 police departments 
from the US and abroad visited the NYPD (Harcourt, 2002).  
 Although there are certain initiatives to adapt the tactics and models 
used at the NYPD, it is still a challenging question whether these tactics can 
be applied to other organizations regardless of country, cultural, and political 
differences. It is no doubt that you can learn from other organizations. There 
are some successful implementations of these tactics in different 
organizations in different countries, but there are some failures as well. It is 
likely to be a number of things that might work generically in the US and 
around the world. At the same time, it is likely to be a number of things that 
might not work or might work only if certain conditions are existent. In this 
regard, the comparison and adaptation of the case of the NYPD should be 
made considering and understanding the realities of each organization within 
different countries.  
 The situation in Istanbul is comparable to the New York City in many 
respects. According to the 2000 census, the population was 10,018,735. It is 
the biggest and the most cosmopolitan city of Turkey. In spite of the low 
level of crime rates in the past compared to other big cities around the world, 
reported crime rates are increasing significantly in the last decade, at least on 
the statistical level. The immigrants coming from other cities of Turkey to 
Istanbul mostly live in ghettos as socially isolated communities. These 
ghettos have become out of control; center and origin of crime. People are 
afraid of being a victim of a crime. Media, with its sensational manner, has 
certainly played a negative role for the increased feeling of unsafe among 
citizens. A survey conducted in 2007 showed that nearly half of the people in 
Istanbul feel unsafe (Jahic & Akdas, 2007). The same survey showed that 
satisfaction rates and trust in police is also low (Jahic & Akdas, 2007). In 
addition, police officers are demoralized and willing to go to other cities. At 
the beginning of the April 2007, Governor of Istanbul declared that he had 
the petition of more than 15000 officers in Istanbul asking for a transfer to 
another city which indicates the level of dissatisfaction among police 
officers. Police officers complain about working hours, promotion system, 
economic conditions, superior-subordinate relations, and organizational 
dysfunction (Yuksel, 2006). The way of policing is reactive. Police is mainly 
responsible for responding crime, doing very little in the way of proactive 
policing for reducing and preventing crime. There have been a lot of calls for 
strong police action in the face of rising crime in Istanbul as well as other 
cities. This general picture demonstrates that the situation in Istanbul is 
comparable to New York City in many respects. The question is the change 
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management model and tactics used to manage change at the NYPD is 
comparable and adaptable to Istanbul Police Department.  
 If the case of New York City is considered at the level of change 
management model, there is no reason to think that the model will not work 
in the Istanbul Police Department. As already mentioned, this change 
management model (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007) has been developed by 
evaluating the lessons learned from repeated change management initiatives. 
The phases of the model as follow; define goals, create an environment for 
change, plan the change, execute and improve, and integrate and sustain 
seem to have a value for any change initiative. This study has already 
explored that the change process of the NYPD by and large fits into this 
model. In addition, this model gives a sense of understanding what to 
consider managing change and different steps that need to be followed. It 
means that any person in an organization that initiates a change process 
should be aware of the importance of having goals in the first step and 
creating an environment for change and planning the change in the second 
step before trying to execute and improve a change initiative.  
 On the other hand, the success of tactics used in each phase is 
certainly dependent on many internal and external factors. The first thing 
you should do is take a look at what is working elsewhere and then see what 
applies to your particular situation. Therefore, it is not reasonable to think 
that some of the tactics of the NYPD will work without any modification or 
understanding the circumstances and concerns surrounding the NYPD. 
There is a need to understand the situation of the NPYD, the US and New 
York within the process of change. The question is if Bratton did not have 
the resources – personnel and equipment-, political authority and support of 
the society, he could be able to lead to such a successful change process at 
NYPD. There is no easy answer for this question. On one hand, there were 
certain things that really necessities political authority, such as ‘broken 
windows policing’. On the other hand, there were certain things just as a 
product of management skills, leadership, and creative strategies. For 
instance, Bratton might not be able to put into practice ‘broken windows’ 
policing, if the government and society would say “we don’t want you 
focusing on the little things because we are concerned it might be seen as 
racially incorrect” (Frum, 2006). Similarly, Turkey has harmonized its laws 
and regulations to EU laws in the last decade. Using aggressive form of 
policing might be criticized as infringement of human rights which makes 
support of political authority for aggressive policing less likely in Turkey. 
However, it is likely to find a common ground for other types of policing 
which focus on reducing crime rather than responding it. Bratton has 
repeatedly proven that police work can reduce crime which might also work 
generically around the world. Within the light of this premise, the important 
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thing is to find out the tactics, methods, and policing style compatible to 
Turkey.  Compstat was another important tool of change process at the 
NYPD. The belief that a department should adapt every tactical aspect of the 
New York City Compstat process might be misleading. Compstat certainly 
require a re-engineering of the adapting police department otherwise it will 
fail to achieve its purpose. However, there is no reason to believe that the 
idea of Compstat will not work in the police organizations in Turkey which 
experience lack of communication, transparency, and accountability. The 
enhanced accountability for results and exchanging failures and successes 
will certainly support change process and produce more pressure on officers 
to be efficient.  In a similar vein, there are many lessons to learn from 
Bratton how to motivate officers in different ways. As stated by Bratton, 
when you don’t have some of the traditional motivators, such as salary 
and benefits, recognizing and supporting police officers through different 
communication channels might work as well. For instance, Bratton was 
able to use media to advertise the officers who had done well, to share best 
and successful practices, and to back up the police officers involved in 
confrontations with the public without clear evidence of police 
wrongdoing. The stories on the media clearly increased in police officers’ 
morale. The system works in reverse in Turkey. In spite of accusing media 
for having prejudice against police, leaders of the police organizations 
should look at to find a way to use media not only to motivate its personnel 
but also to build confidence and trust in public which is low right now. 
Turkey has highly centralized, bureaucratic police organization and little 
autonomy for city police departments which might prevent police 
departments from empowering the authority formally to the precinct 
commanders. However, there is still room to empower the authority partly 
to the precinct commanders. Therefore, it is clear that the tactics used at the 
NYPD have a value for police organizations in Turkey, but all the tactics 
might be considered in the frame of what is working elsewhere and then see 
what applies to the police organization you are responsible for.  
 
Conclusion 
 The implication of this paper is that it is possible to change the police 
and police organizations to serve in a way that responds the needs of 
changing society. Change is constant and police organizations have also 
changed dramatically in the last two or three decades. If you are not 
responsive to change and manage the change in accordance with the 
contemporary values in the society, failure is inevitable.  
 When you talk about organizational change, people tend to consider 
it the responsibility of the highest authority. However, any department, any 
unit in a department even any personnel in a unit has its own responsibility 
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and power to manage the change. A captain in a police station can make a 
big difference in the scope of the borough she/he is responsible. Like most of 
organizations in the world, it is possible to count a long list of excuses as a 
barrier to change which itself is the biggest barrier to change. However, there 
are some good examples from some police departments in different cities of 
Turkey which subject to positive media attention. In spite of the lack of 
resources, personnel and government support, these examples show that 
there is a room for change whether in big or small ways. The prior thing is a 
strong desire and increased understanding of change process.  
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Source: (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
